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Hidden Variables and the Two Theorems of John Bell
N. David Mermin
What follows is the text of my article that appeared in Reviews of Modern Physics
65, 803-815 (1993). I’ve corrected the three small errors posted over the years at the
Revs. Mod. Phys. website. I’ve removed two decorative figures and changed the other
two figures into (unnumbered) displayed equations. I’ve made a small number of minor
editorial improvements. I’ve added citations to some recent critical articles by Jeffrey Bub
and Dennis Dieks. And I’ve added a few footnotes of commentary.∗
I’m posting my old paper at arXiv for several reasons. First, because it’s still timely
and I’d like to make it available to a wider audience in its 25th anniversary year. Second,
because, rereading it, I was struck that Section VII raises some questions that, as far as
I know, have yet to be adequately answered. And third, because it has recently been
criticized by Bub and Dieks as part of their broader criticism of John Bell’s and Grete
Hermann’s reading of John von Neumann.∗∗
∗ The added footnotes are denoted by single or double asterisks. The footnotes from
the original article have the same numbering as in that article.
∗∗ Ru¨diger Schack and I will soon post a paper in which we give our own view of von
Neumann’s four assumptions about quantum mechanics, how he uses them to prove his
famous no-hidden-variable theorem, and how he fails to point out that one of his assump-
tions can be violated by a hidden-variables theory without necessarily doing violence to
the whole structure of quantum mechanics. Schack and I explain how Bub and Dieks
miss this point in their criticisms of Bell and Hermann. Bell and Hermann have indeed
correctly identified von Neumann’s oversight, as I described, perhaps too briefly, in the
review article reproduced below.
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Abstract. Although skeptical of the prohibitive power of no–hid-
den–variables theorems, John Bell was himself responsible for the two
most important ones. I describe some recent versions of the lesser known
of the two (familar to experts as the “Kochen–Specker theorem”) which
have transparently simple proofs. One of the new versions can be con-
verted without additional analysis into a powerful form of the very much
better known “Bell’s Theorem”, thereby clarifying the conceptual link
between these two results of Bell.
Like all authors of noncommissioned reviews he thinks that he can restate the po-
sition with such clarity and simplicity that all previous discussions will be eclipsed.
— J. S. Bell, 1966
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I. THE DREAM OF HIDDEN VARIABLES
It is a fundamental quantum doctrine that a measurement does not, in general, reveal
a pre-existing value of the measured property. On the contrary, the outcome of a mea-
surement is brought into being by the act of measurement itself, a joint manifestation of
the state of the probed system and the probing apparatus. Precisely how the particular
result of an individual measurement is brought into being—Heisenberg’s “transition from
the possible to the actual”—is inherently unknowable. Only the statistical distribution of
many such encounters is a proper matter for scientific inquiry.
We have been told this so often that the eyes glaze over at the words, and half of you
have probably stopped reading already. But is it really true? Or, more conservatively,
is it really necessary? Does quantum mechanics, that powerful, practical, phenomenally
accurate computational tool of physicist, chemist, biologist, and engineer, really demand
this weak link between our knowledge and the objects of that knowledge? Setting aside
the metaphysics that emerged from urgent debates and long walks in Copenhagen parks,
can one point to anything in the modern quantum theory that forces on us such an act of
intellectual renunciation? Or is it merely reverence for the Patriarchs that leads us to deny
that a measurement reveals a value that was already there, prior to the measurement?
Well, you might say, it’s easy enough to deduce from quantum mechanics that in
general the measurement apparatus disturbs the system on which it acts. True, but so
what? One can easily imagine a measurement messing up any number of things, while
still revealing the value of a pre-existing property. Ah, you might add, but the uncertainty
principle prohibits the existence of joint values for certain important groups of physical
properties. So taught the Patriarchs, but as deduced from within the quantum theory
itself, the uncertainty principle only prohibits the possibility of preparing an ensemble of
systems in which all those properties are sharply defined; like most of quantum mechanics,
it scrupulously avoids making any statements whatever about individual members of that
ensemble. But surely indeterminism, you might conclude, is built into the very bones of the
modern quantum theory. Entirely beside the point! The question is whether properties of
individual systems possess values prior to the measurement that reveals them; not whether
there are laws enabling us to predict at an earlier time what those values will be.
What, in fact, can you say if called upon to refute a celebrated polymath who con-
fidently declares∗ that “Most theoretical physicists are guilty of. . .fail[ing] to distinguish
∗ Adler, 1992, p. 300.
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between a measurable indeterminacy and the epistemic indeterminability of what is in re-
ality determinate. The indeterminacy discovered by physical measurements of subatomic
phenomena simply tells us that we cannot know the definite position and velocity of an
electron at one instant of time. It does not tell us that the electron, at any instant of
time, does not have a definite position and velocity. [Physicists]. . .convert what is not
measurable by them into the unreal and the nonexistent.”
Are we, then, arrogant and irrational in refusing to consider the possibility of an
expanded description of the world, in which properties such as position and velocity do
have simultaneous values, even though nature has conspired to prevent us from ascertaining
them both at the same time? Efforts to construct such deeper levels of description, in
which properties of individual systems do have pre-existing values revealed by the act
of measurement, are known as hidden-variables programs. A frequently offered analogy
is that a successful hidden-variables theory would be to quantum mechanics as classical
mechanics is to classical statistical mechanics:∗ quantum mechanics would survive intact,
but would be understood in terms of a deeper and more detailed picture of the world.
Efforts, on the other hand, to put our notorious refusal on a more solid foundation by
demonstrating that a hidden-variables program necessarily requires outcomes for certain
experiments that disagree with the data predicted by the quantum theory, are called no-
hidden-variables theorems (or, vulgarly, “no-go theorems”).
In the absence of any detailed features of a hidden-variables program, quantum me-
chanics is incapable of demonstrating that the general dream is impossible.1 If the program
consists of nothing beyond the bald assertion that such values exist, then while quantum
physicists may protest, the quantum theory is powerless to produce a case where experi-
mental data can refute that claim, precisely because the theory is mute on what goes on in
individual systems. A hidden-variables theory has to make some assumptions about the
character of those pre-existing values if quantum theory is to have anything to attack.
John Bell proved two great no-hidden-variables theorems. The first, given in Bell,
1966, is not as well known to physicists as it is to philosophers, who call it the Kochen-
∗ See, for example, A. Einstein in Schilpp, 1949, p. 672.
1 David Bohm (Bohm, 1952) has, in fact, provided a hidden-variables theory that, if
nothing else, serves as a proof that an unqualified refutation is impossible. I will return to
Bohm theory in Section IX, merely noting here that it does exactly what Mortimer Adler
wants, while remaining in complete agreement with quantum mechanics in its predictions
for the outcome of any experiment.
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Specker (or KS) theorem2 because of a version of the same argument, apparently more to
their taste, derived independently by S. Kochen and E. P. Specker, 1967. I shall refer to it
as the Bell-KS theorem. The second theorem, “Bell’s Theorem”, is given in Bell, 1964,3 and
is widely known not only among physicists, but also to philosophers, journalists, mystics,
novelists, and poets.
One reason the Bell-KS theorem is the less celebrated of the two is that the assump-
tions made by the hidden-variables theories it prohibits can only be formulated within the
formal structure of quantum mechanics. One cannot describe the Bell-KS theorem to a
general audience, in terms of a collection of black-box gedanken experiments, the only role
of quantum mechanics being to provide gedanken results, which all by themselves imply
that at least one of those experiments could not have been revealing a pre-existing outcome.
Bell’s Theorem, however, can be cast in precisely such terms.4 Indeed the hidden-variables
theories ruled out by Bell’s Theorem rest on assumptions that not only can be stated in
entirely non-technical terms but are so compelling that the establishment of their falsity
has been called, not frivolously, “the most profound discovery of science”.∗
The comparative obscurity of the Bell-KS theorem may also derive in part from the
fact that the assumptions on which it rests were severly and immediately criticized by Bell
himself: “That so much follows from such apparently innocent assumptions leads us to
question their innocence”. We shall return to his criticism in Section VII.
A less edifying reason for the greater fame of Bell’s Theorem among physicists is that
its proof is utterly transparent, while proving the Bell-KS theorem entails a moderately
elaborate exercise in geometry. Physicists are simply less willing than philosophers to
suffer through a few pages of dreary analysis to prove something they never doubted in
the first place. So although all physicists know about Bell’s Theorem, most look blank
when you mention Kochen-Specker or Bell-KS. Now, however, these particular grounds for
such ignorance have been removed. Within the past few years new versions of the Bell-
KS theorem have been found∗∗ that are so simple that even those physicists who regard
2 As mathematics, both results are special cases of a more powerful analysis by A. M.
Gleason, 1957.
3 In spite of the earlier publication date Bell’s Theorem was proved after Bell proved
his 1966 theorem. The manuscript of Bell, 1966, languished unattended for over a year in
a drawer in the editorial offices of Reviews of Modern Physics .
4 Several such formulations of Bell’s Theorem are given in Mermin, 1990a.
∗ Stapp, 1977.
∗∗ Mermin, 1990b.
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such efforts as pointless, can grasp the argument with negligible waste of time and mental
energy. Besides making the argument so easy that even impatient physicists can enjoy it,
one of the new forms of the Bell-KS theorem can also be readily converted into the striking
new version of Bell’s Theorem invented by Greenberger, Horne, and Zeilinger,5 thereby
shedding a new light on the relation between these two results of Bell.
II. PLAUSIBLE CONSTRAINTS ON A HIDDEN-VARIABLES THEORY
I now specify more precisely the general features of a hidden-variables theory. Quan-
tum mechanics deals with a set of observables A,B,C, . . . and a set of states |Ψ〉, |Φ〉, . . . .
If we are given a physical system described by a particular state, then quantum mechanics
gives us the probability of getting a given result when measuring one of the observables.
More generally, if we have a group of mutually commuting observables, quantum mechan-
ics asserts that we can do an experiment that measures them simultaneously, and gives us
the joint distribution for the values of each of the observables in that mutually commuting
set.
We wish to entertain the heretical view that the results of a measurement are not
brought into being by the act of measurement itself. This heresy takes the state vector to
describe an ensemble of systems, and maintains that in each individual member of that
ensemble every observable does indeed have a definite value which the measurement merely
reveals when carried out on that particular individual system. The quantum mechanical
rules, applied to a given state, give the statistics obeyed by those definite values in the
ensemble described by that state. The uncertainty principle is not a restriction on the
ability of observables to possess values in individual systems, but a limitation on the
kinds of ensembles of individual systems it is possible to prepare, stemming from the
unavoidable disturbance the state-preparation procedure imposes on the system. If two
observables fail to commute then the uncertainty principle does not prohibit both from
having definite values in an individual system. It merely insists that it is impossible to
prepare an ensemble of systems in which the values of neither observable fluctuate from
one individual system to another.
To this kind of talk the well-trained quantum mechanician says “Rubbish!” and gets
back to serious business. But is it possible to offer a better rejoinder? Is it possible to
5 Greenberger, 1989. I have given a concise version of the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger
argument in Mermin, 1990c and 1990d. An expanded discussion of their original argument
can be found in Greenberger, 1990.
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demonstrate not only that the innocent view is at odds with the prevailing orthodoxy, but
that it is, in fact, directly refuted by the quantum mechanical formalism itself, without any
appeal to an interpretation of that formalism? A no-hidden-variables theorem attempts to
provide such a refutation. It is only an attempt because any such theorem must make some
assumption on the nature of the hidden variables it excludes, which a persistent heretic
can always call into question. Here is what I hope you will agree are a plausible set of
assumptions for a straightforward hidden-variables theory:6
Given an ensemble of identical physical systems all prepared in the state |Φ〉 described
by observables A,B,C, . . . such a theory should assign to each individual member of that
ensemble a set of numerical values for each observable, v(A), v(B), v(C) . . ., so that if any
observable or mutually commuting subset of observables is measured on that individual
system, the results of the measurement will be the corresponding values.7 The theory
should provide a rule for every state |Φ〉 telling us how to distribute those values over the
members of the ensemble described by |Φ〉 in such a way that the statistical distribution
of outcomes for any measurement quantum mechanics permits, agree with the predictions
of quantum mechanics.
Some of the constraints quantum mechanics imposes on the values are independent
of the state |Φ〉 we are examining. In particular quantum mechanics requires that the
result of measuring an observable must be an eigenvalue of the corresponding hermitian
operator. Therefore only the eigenvalues of A can be allowed as values v(A). Quantum
mechanics further requires that if A,B,C, . . . are a mutually commuting subset of the
observables then the only allowed results of a simultaneous measurement of A,B,C, . . .
are a set of simultaneous eigenvalues. This correspondingly restricts the set of values
v(A), v(B), v(C), . . . possessed by any individual system. In particular, since any functional
identity
f(A,B,C, . . .) = 0 (1)
6 But in VII we will come back, with Bell, to criticize one of them, so look them
over carefully! At this point I deliberately refrain from calling the elusive culprit to your
attention. It is my hope that you will finding the assumptions sufficiently harmless to be
curious whether any hidden-variables theory meeting such apparently benign conditions
can indeed be ruled out by hard-headed quantum-mechanical calculation, rather than
merely being rejected because it is in bad taste.
7 Whether, and in what way, those values depend on new parameters or degrees of
freedom is a detail of the particular hidden-variables theory, and plays no role in what
follows, except for the 2-dimensional example of Bell described below.
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satisfied by a mutually commuting set of observables is also satisfied by their simultaneous
eigenvalues it follows that if a set of mutually commuting observables satisfies a relation of
the form (1) then the values assigned to them in an individual system must also be related
by
f(v(A), v(B), v(C), . . .) = 0. (2)
Remarkably, some no-hidden-variables theorems arrive at a counterexample by con-
sidering only (1) and (2), without even needing to appeal to the further constraints on the
values impossed by the statistical properties of a particular state. The Bell-KS theorem is
such a result. Others, of which Bell’s Theorem is the most important example, require the
properties of a special state to construct counterexamples. We shall examine in VIII why
it might be necessary for the scope of the counterexample to be restricted in this way. But
before we begin, let us first look at a famous false start.
III. VON NEUMANN’S SILLY ASSUMPTION
Many generations of graduate students who might have been tempted to try to con-
struct hidden-variables theories were beaten into submission by the claim that von Neu-
mann, 1932, had proved that it could not be done. A few years later∗ Grete Hermann,
1935, pointed out a glaring deficiency in the argument, but she seems to have been entirely
ignored. Everybody continued to cite the von Neumann proof. A third of a century passed
before John Bell, 1966, rediscovered the fact that von Neumann’s no-hidden-variables proof
was based on an assumption that can only be described as silly8—so silly,∗∗ in fact that
one is led to wonder whether the proof was ever studied by either the students or those
who appealed to it to rescue them from speculative adventures.
∗ See Jammer, 1974, p. 273.
8 While giving a physics colloquium on these matters I was taken to task by an outraged
member of the audience for using the adjective “silly” to characterize von Neumann’s
assumption. I subsequently discovered that, like many penetrating observations about
quantum mechanics, this one was made emphatically by John Bell: “Yet the von Neumann
proof, if you actually come to grips with it, falls apart in your hands! There is nothing
to it. It’s not just flawed, it’s silly ! . . . When you translate [his assumptions] into terms
of physical disposition, they’re nonsense. You may quote me on that: The proof of von
Neumann is not merely false but foolish!” (Interview in Omni , May, 1988, p. 88.)
∗∗ Recently Bub, 2010, 2011, and Dieks, 2017, have argued that Bell and Hermann had
misunderstood von Neumann. I disagree. Ru¨diger Schack and I are writing a commentary
on von Neumann’s argument, that contains our criticism of Bub and Dieks.
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A particular consequence of (1) and (2) is that if A and B commute then the value
assigned to C = A+B must satisfy
v(C) = v(A) + v(B), (3)
as an expression of the identity C − A − B = 0. Von Neumann’s silly assumption was
to impose the condition (3) on a hidden-variables theory even when A and B do not
commute. But when A and B do not commute they do not have simultaneous eigenvalues,
they cannot be simultaneously measured, and there are absolutely no grounds for imposing
such a requirement. Von Neumann was led to it because it holds in the mean: for any
state |Φ〉, quantum mechanics requires, whether or not A and B commute, that
〈Φ|A+B|Φ〉 = 〈Φ|A|Φ〉+ 〈Φ|B|Φ〉. (4)
But to require that v(A+B) = v(A) + v(B) in each individual system of the ensemble is
to ensure that a relation holds in the mean by imposing it case by case—a sufficient, but
hardly a necessary condition. Silly!∗
That the results of quantum mechanics are incompatible with values satisfying this
condition is easy to see even in the two-dimensional state space that describes a single
spin– 1
2
. Let A = σx, B = σy. The eigenvalues of the Pauli matrices are ±1 so the values
v(A) and v(B) are each restricted to be ±1. Thus the only values v(A)+v(B) can have are
−2, 0, and 2. But A+B is just √2 times the component of σ along the direction bisecting
the angle between the x– and y–axes. As a result its allowed values are v(A+B) = ±√2.
Therefore a hidden-variables theory of this simple system cannot satisfy (3). But there
is no reason to insist that it should! Indeed, having exposed the silliness in the von
Neumann argument, Bell went immediately on to construct a hidden-variables model for
a single spin– 1
2
that satisfies all the non-silly conditions specified above. I now give this
construction, but include it only to emphasize the non–triviality of the impossibility proofs
we shall then turn to. Readers not interested in the details of Bell’s counterexample can
skip to Section IV.
∗ Rereading these last two sentences in the light of the defense of von Neumann offered
by Bub, 2010, 2011, and Dieks, 2017, I realize that I am giving too abbreviated a summary
of what von Neumann actually says. Could it be just this cartoon of his argument that
is silly? In my forthcoming paper with Schack we demonstrate that in his full, carefully
articulated development von Neumann actually does commit a genuine blunder, clearly
identified by Bell, the best one-word characterization of which I continue to believe is
“silly”.
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In a two-dimensional state space every state is an eigenstate of the component σn of
the spin along some direction n:9
σn| ↑n〉 = | ↑n〉, (5)
and every observable has the form
A = a0 + a · σ, (6)
where a0 is a real scalar and a, a real 3-vector. A set of observables A,B,C, . . . is mutually
commuting if and only if the vectors a,b, c, . . . are all parallel. The eigenvalues of A, and
hence the allowed values v(A), are restricted to the two numbers
v(A) = a0 ± a, (7)
where a is the magnitude of the vector a. The simultaneous eigenvalues of a set of mutually
commuting observables are given by chosing one sign in (7) for those observables whose
vectors point one way along their common direction, and the opposite sign for those whose
vectors point the other way. Because each observable A takes on only two values the
distribution of those values in a given state is entirely determined by the mean of A, which
is given by
〈↑n |A| ↑n〉 = a0 + a · n. (8)
A rule associating with each observable one of its eigenvalues will yield simultaneous
eigenvalues for mutually commuting observables if it always specifies the opposite sign in
(7) for commuting observables associated with oppositely directed vectors. We require, in
addition, for each state | ↑n〉, that the rule specify a distribution of those values yielding
the statistics demanded by (8). Here is a rule that does everything:10 Given a particular
individual system from an ensemble described by the state | ↑n〉, pick at random a second
9 This is because every state can be related to | ↑z〉 by a unitary transformation, but in a
2-dimensional state space any unitary transformation, being a member of SU(2), represents
a rotation.
10 It is a little simpler then the one Bell gives. One can extend the rule to cover the
case (m+ n) · a = 0, but since this has zero statistical weight, I do not bother. Note that
the values assigned to non-commuting observables do not satisfy von Neumann’s additivity
condition in individual members of the ensemble, although their average over the ensemble
does, which is all quantum mechanics requires.
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unit vector m (which plays the role of the hidden–variable) and assign to each observable
A the values
vn(A) = a0 + a, if (m+ n) · a > 0,
vn(A) = a0 − a, if (m+ n) · a < 0.
(9)
An elementary integration confirms that the mean over a uniform distribution of directions
of m of the value (9) of any observable in the state | ↑n〉 is indeed given by the quantum
mechanical result (8): ∫
dΩm
4pi
vn(A) = a0 + a · n. (10)
IV. THE BELL–KOCHEN–SPECKER THEOREM
Having thus given an absurdly simple example of what had solemnly been declared
impossible for the past three decades, Bell proceeded to show that the trick could no
longer be accomplished in a state space of 3 or more11 dimensions;12 i.e. he gave a new
no-hidden-variables proof that did not rely on the silly condition. I now give the full proof
of this Bell-KS theorem, but here too, I include it only to emphasize the much greater
simplicity of the new versions that follow in Sections V and VI, to which readers with no
interest in the early history of the subject may jump without conceptual loss.
Just as it is convenient to use the algebra of spin– 1
2
to describe a 2-dimensional state
space, it is also convenient to describe the 3-dimensional state space in terms of observables
built out of angular momentum components for a particle of spin-1.13 The observables we
consider are the squares of the components of the spin along various directions. Such
observables have eigenvalues 1 or 0, since the unsquared spin components have eigenvalues
1, 0, or −1. Furthermore the sums of the squared spin components along any three
orthogonal directions u, v, and w satisfy
S2u + S
2
v + S
2
w = s(s+ 1) = 2, (11)
11 His argument focuses on a space of exactly 3 dimensions, which can, however, be a
subspace of a higher dimensional space; the same remark applies to the new arguments in
4 and 8 dimensions given in Sections V and VI.
12 Peculiar to 2 dimensions is the fact that all observables that commute with any non-
trivial observable A necessarily commute with each other.
13 Bell actually works with orthogonal projections, but the correspondence is entirely
trivial: S2x = 1− Px, etc. I find it more congenial to follow Kochen and Specker in using
spin components, though the version of the argument I give is Bell’s, not theirs.
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since we are dealing with a particle of spin-1 (s = 1). Finally the squared components of
the spin along any three orthogonal directions constitute a mutually commuting set.14
Suppose we are given a set of directions containing many different orthogonal triads,
and the corresponding set of observables consisting of the squared spin components along
each of the directions. Since the three observables associated with any orthogonal triad
commute, they can be simultaneously measured and the values such a measurement reveals
for each of them, 0 or 1, must satisfy the same constraint (11) as the observables themselves.
Thus two of the values must be 1 and the third, 0. We would have a no-hidden-variables
theorem if we could find a quantum mechanical state in which the statistics for the results
of measuring any three observables associated with orthogonal triads could not be realized
by any distribution of assignments of 1 or 0 to every direction in the set, consistent with
the constraint.
The Bell-KS theorem does substantially more than that: it produces a set of directions
for which there is no way whatever to assign 1’s and 0’s to the directions consistent with
the constraint (11), thereby rendering the statistical state-dependent part of the argument
unnecessary. This is accomplished by solving the following problem in geometry: Find
a set of 3-dimensional vectors (i.e. directions) with the property that it is impossible to
color each vector red (i.e. assign the value 1 to the squared spin component along that
direction) or blue (i.e. assign the value 0) in such a way that every subset of 3 mutually
orthogonal vectors contains just one blue and two red vectors.
The unpleasantly tedious part of the solution consists of showing that if the angle
between two vectors of different color is less than tan−1(0.5) = 26.565 degrees, then we
can find additional vectors which, with the original two, constitute a set that cannot be
colored according to the rules. Since all that matters is the direction of each vector, we can
choose their magnitudes at our convenience. We take the blue vector to be a unit vector z
defining the z-axis and take the red vector a to lie in the y-z plane: a = z+αy, 0 < α < 0.5.
We now make several elementary observations:
1. Since z is blue, x and y must both be red.15
2. Indeed, any vector in the x-y plane must be red, since one cannot have two orthogonal
blue vectors. In particular c = βx + y must be red, for arbitrary β. Particularly
14 This is not a general property of angular momentum components but it does hold
for spin–1, as is evident from the correspondence with orthogonal projections noted in the
preceding footnote.
15 As I mention each new vector, add it to the set.
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interesting values of β will be specified shortly.
3. Similarly, since a and x are red, any vector in their plane, and, in particular, d =
x/β − a/α must be red.16
4. Because a = z + αy, d is orthogonal to c= βx+y. Since both c and d are red,
the normal to their plane must be blue, and therefore any vector in their plane, in
particular e = c + d must be red.
5. But adding the explicit forms of c and d we see that e = (β + β−1)x− z/α.
6. Since α is less than 0.5, 1/α is greater than 2. Since |β + β−1| ranges between 2 and
∞ as β ranges through all real numbers, we can find a value of β such that e is along
the direction of f = x−z. Changing the sign of β gives another e along the direction
of g = −x − z.
7. Since e is red whatever the value of β, f and g must be red.
8. But f and g are orthogonal. The normal to their plane is therefore blue and any vector
in their plane is necessarily red.
9. But z = −1
2
f − 1
2
g is in the plane of f and g, and z is blue.
10. Contradiction! Therefore the set cannot be colored according to the rules if a and z
have different colors.
The rest is genuinely trivial. We find an uncolorable set of directions by noting that
since 22.5 degrees < tan−1(0.5), the z-axis must have the same color as a direction 22.5
degrees away from it in the y-z plane, or we could produce an uncolorable set as described
above. But that direction must then have the same color as the direction in the y-z plane
another 22.5 degrees away from the z-axis. Two more such steps gets us down to the
y-axis, which must thus have the same color as the z-axis. Repeating this procedure in
the y-x plane we conclude that the x-axis must share that same color. But three mutually
orthogonal axes cannot all have the same color: two must be red and one blue. Therefore
the 5 directions in the y-z plane plus the 4 additional directions in the x-y plane plus the
additional directions needed to carry out steps 1-10 above for each pair separated by 22.5
degrees constitute an uncolorable set.
Bell did not conclude his proof with these elementary remarks about steps of 22.5
degrees. Instead, after proving that differently colored directions must be more than a
16 If you happen to be interested in counting how many vectors are in the uncolorable
set we end up with, then whenever we add a red vector v in the plane of two orthogonal
red vectors you should also add to the set, if they are not already present, a second red
vector in that plane perpendicular to v, as well as a blue vector perpendicular to the plane.
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minimum angle apart, he simply noted that it was therefore impossible to associate a color
with every direction, since any coloring of the sphere with just two colors obviously must
have different colors arbitrarily close together. As a result, many philosophers characterize
his proof as a “continuum proof” and prefer the argument Kochen and Specker indepen-
dently gave a year later, which gives a slightly different (weaker) version of the minimum
angle theorem but explicitly displays a finite set of directions—117 of them—which cannot
be colored according to the rules. Clearly the Bell argument as stated above also uses only
a finite set of directions. But there is no point making a fuss about this because both ar-
guments have now been superseded by an argument that is also state–independent, whose
algebraic part is even more elementary (appealing to no possibly unfamiliar result about
the commutation of squares of orthogonal spin components), which requires no subsequent
geometric analysis at all, and which uses far fewer observables.
The only price one pays for the simplicity is that the argument now requires a state
space of at least 4 dimensions.17 So unless one has a special interest in proving no-hidden-
variables theorems in 3 dimensions, one can safely declare the old Bell or Kochen-Specker
versions of the theorem obsolete, sparing future generations of philosophers of science a
painful rite of passage and making the result readily available even to physicists in ten
minutes of an introductory quantum mechanics course.
Before consigning the old argument to the history books, I digress to remark that
the 117 directions seem to have held a great power over the philosophic imagination. The
cover illustration of a well-known treatise on the philosophy of quantum mechanics,∗ for
example, is emblazoned with an intricate diagram used by Kochen and Specker, 1987, to
represent their set of 117 uncolorable directions. Although the diagram is unfamiliar to all
but a handful of quantum physicists, a distinguished philosopher of science regarded it as
an appropriate icon for the entire subject.
Since 1967 other sets of uncolorable directions have been discovered with fewer vectors.
The current world record holders are J. Conway and S. Kochen18 with 31, but Asher Peres,
1991, has found a prettier set of 33 with cubic symmetry which can be exploited to give
a proof of the no-coloring theorem that is more compact than Bell’s. Roger Penrose has
17 In hindsight this might have been guessed: if a no-hidden-variables theorem is impos-
sible in 2 dimensions, and rather complicated in 3, extrapolation suggests that it might be
easy in 4.
∗ Michael Redhead, 1987. The cover is reproduced as Figure 1 in Mermin, 1993.
18 S. Kochen, private communication.
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pointed out that Peres’s set of 33 directions can be described as follows: take a cube and
superimpose it with its 90 degree rotations about two perpendicular lines connecting its
center to the midpoints of an edge. Peres’s directions point to the vertices and to the
centers of the faces and edges of the resulting set of 3 interpenetrating cubes. This very
figure occurs as a large ornament atop one of the two towers in M. Escher’s famous drawing
of the impossible waterfall.∗
V. A SIMPLER BELL-KS THEOREM IN 4 DIMENSIONS
I now turn to the version of the Bell-KS theorem that works in a 4-dimensional
state space.19 Our task is exactly the same as Bell, Kochen, and Specker faced in
the 3-dimensional case: we must exhibit a set of observables A, B, C . . . for which we
can prove that it is impossible to associate with each observable one of its eigenvalues,
v(A), v(B), v(C), . . . in such a way that all functional relationships between mutually com-
muting subsets of the observables are also satisfied by the associated values. The only
difference is that now we can do the trick with many fewer observables, and an entirely
trivial proof.
In 4 dimensions it is convenient to represent observables in terms of the Pauli matri-
ces for two independent spin-1
2
particles:20 σ1µ and σ
2
ν . The relevant properties of these
observables are the familiar ones: the squares of each are unity so the eigenvalues of each
are ±1; any component of σ1µ commutes with any other component of σ2ν ; when µ and
ν specify orthogonal directions σiµ anticommutes with σ
i
ν for i = 1, 2; and σ
i
xσ
i
y = iσ
i
z
for i = 1, 2. Consider, then, the nine observables shown below, which it is convenient to
arrange in groups of three on six intersecting lines that form a square.
σ1x σ
2
x σ
1
xσ
2
x
σ2y σ
1
y σ
1
yσ
2
y
σ1xσ
2
y σ
2
xσ
1
y σ
1
zσ
2
z
∗ Escher, 1970. The waterfall is reproduced as Figure 2 of Mermin, 1993.
19 This argument was inspired by an earlier version by A. Peres, 1990, that uses an even
smaller number of observables, but only applies to an ensemble prepared in a particular
state.
20 These are simply to be viewed as a convenient set of operators in terms of which to
expand more general 4-dimensional operators; we need not be talking about two spin-1
2
particles at all.
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To prove that it is impossible to assign values to all nine observables we merely note
that:
(a) The observables in each of the three rows and each of the three columns are mutually
commuting. This is immediately evident for the top two rows and first two columns
from the left; it is true for the bottom row and right-hand column because in every
case there is a pair of anti-commutations.
(b) The product of the three observables in the column on the right is −1. The product
of the three observables in the other two columns and all three rows is +1.
(c) Since the values assigned to mutually commuting observables must obey any identities
satisfied by the observables themselves, the identities (b) require the product of the
values assigned to the three observables in each row to be 1, and the product of
the values assigned to the three observables in each column to be 1 for the first two
columns and −1 for the column on the right.
But (c) is impossible to satisfy, since the row identities require the product of all nine
values to be 1, while the column identities require it to be −1.
I maintain that this is as simple a version of the Bell-KS theorem as one is ever likely
to find,21 and that it belongs in elementary texts on quantum mechanics as a direct demon-
stration, straight from the formalism, without any appeal to decrees by the Founders, that
one cannot realize the naive ensemble interpretation of the theory on which the attempt to
assign values is based. It is nevertheless susceptible to the same criticism that Bell himself
immediately brought to bear against his own version of the theorem. Before turning to
that criticism, however, I describe a comparably simple version of the Bell-KS theorem
that works in an 8-dimensional state space22 that we shall find is capable of evading Bell’s
criticism in a way that the 4-dimensional version is not. The 8-dimensional argument pro-
vides a direct link between the Bell-KS theorems and their illustrious companion, Bell’s
Theorem, when Bell’s theorem is presented in the spectacular form recently discovered by
Greenberger, Horne, and Zeilinger, 1989.
21 Peres, 1991, recasts the argument as a no-coloring theorem for a set of 24 directions in
4–dimensions, thereby making it complicated again. The advantage of the 4-dimensional
argument over the traditional one in 3 dimensions is just that no such analysis is necessary.
22 That the 3-spin form of the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger version of Bell’s Theorem
could be reinterpreted as a version of the Bell-KS theorem was brought to my attention
by A. Stairs.
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VI. A SIMPLE AND MORE VERSATILE Bell-KS THEOREM
IN 8 DIMENSIONS.
We construct our 8-dimensional observables out of three independent spins– 1
2
, and
consider the set of ten observables shown below, which it is now convenient to arrange in
groups of four on 5 intersecting lines that form a five-pointed star:
σ1y
σ1xσ
2
xσ
3
x σ
1
yσ
2
yσ
3
x σ
1
yσ
2
xσ
3
y σ
1
xσ
2
yσ
3
y
σ3x σ
3
y
σ1x
σ2y σ
2
x
To prove that it is impossible to assign values to all 10 observables note that:
(a) The four observables on each of the five lines of the star are mutually commuting.
This is immediately evident for all but the horizontal line, where it follows from the
fact that interchanging the observables in each of the six possible pairs always requires
a pair of anticommutations.
(b) The product of the four observables on every line of the star but the horizontal line
is 1. The product of the four observables on the horizontal line is −1.
(c) Since the values assigned to mutually commuting observables must obey any identities
satisfied by the observables themselves, the identities (b) require the product of the
values assigned to the four observables on the horizontal line of the star to be −1, and
the product of the values assigned to the four observables on each of the other lines
to be +1.
Condition (c) requires the product over all five lines of the products of the values on each
line to be −1. But this is impossible, for each observable is at the intersection of two lines.
Its value appears twice in the product over all five lines, and that product must therefore
be +1.
This hardly more elaborate 8-dimensional version of the theorem has an additional
virtue that the 4-dimensional version lacks. To see this and to see the connection with
Bell’s Theorem we turn, finally, to Bell’s objection to his own argument.
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VII. IS THE Bell-KS THEOREM SILLY?
In all these cases, as Bell pointed out immediately after proving the Bell-KS theorem,
we have “tacitly assumed that the measurement of an observable must yield the same
value independently of what other measurements must be made simultaneously.” In Bell’s
3-dimensional example and in both the 4- and 8-dimensional examples we required each
observable to have a value in an individual system that would give the result of its mea-
surement, regardless of which of two sets of mutually commuting observables we chose to
measure it with. But since the additional observables in one of those sets do not all com-
mute with the additional observables in the other, the two cases are incompatible. “These
different possibilities require different experimental arrangements; there is no a priori rea-
son to believe that the results . . . should be the same. The result of an observation may
reasonably depend not only on the state of the system (including hidden-variables) but
also on the complete disposition of the apparatus.”∗
This tacit assumption that a hidden-variables theory has to assign to an observable A
the same value whether A is measured as part of the mutually commuting set A,B,C, . . .
or a second mutually commuting set A,L,M, . . . even when some of the L,M, . . . fail to
commute with some of the B,C, . . ., is called “non-contextuality” by the philosophers. Is
non-contextuality, as Bell seemed to suggest, as silly a condition as von Neumann’s—a
foolish disregard of “the impossibility of any sharp distinction between the behavior of
atomic objects and the interaction with the measuring instruments which serve to define
the conditions under which the phenomena appear,” as Bohr23 put it?
I would not characterize the assumption of non-contextuality as a silly constraint on a
hidden-variables theory. It is surely an important fact that the impossibility of embedding
quantum mechanics in a non-contextual hidden-variables theory rests not only on Bohr’s
doctrine of the inseparability of the objects and the measuring instruments, but also on
a straightforward contradiction, independent of one’s philosophic point of view, between
some quantitative consequences of non-contextuality and the quantitative predictions of
quantum mechanics.
Furthermore, there are features of quantum mechanics that seem strongly to hint at
∗ Bell, 1966.
23 N. Bohr in Schilpp, 1949 and cited in Bell, 1966. Bell’s invocation of Bohr, to whom
any hidden-variables theory would have been anathema, in order to dismiss the implications
of his own no-hidden-variables theorem, thereby maintaining the viability of the hidden-
variables program, was aptly characterized by Abner Shimony as “a judo-like maneuver.”
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an underlying non-contextual hidden-variables theory as the only available explanation.24
Most strikingly, although it is indisputable that measuring A with mutually commuting
B,C, . . . requires a different experimental arrangement from measuring it with mutually
commuting L,M, . . . whenever some of L,M, . . . fail to commute with some of B,C, . . . ,
it is nevertheless an elementary theorem of quantum mechanics that the joint distribution
p(a, b, c, . . .) for the first experiment yields precisely the same marginal distribution p(a) as
does the joint distribution p(a, l,m . . .) for the second, in spite of the different experimental
arrangements. If we do the experiment to measure A with B,C, . . . on an ensemble of
systems prepared in the state Ψ and ignore the results of the other observables, we get
exactly the same statistics for A as we would have obtained had we instead done the quite
different experiment to measure A with L,M, . . . on that same ensemble. The obvious way
to account for this, particularly when entertaining the possibility of a hidden-variables
theory, is to propose that both experiments reveal a set of values for A in the individual
systems that is the same, regardless of which experiment we choose to extract them from.
Putting it the other way around, a contextual hidden-variables account of this fact would
be as mysteriously silent as the quantum theory on the question of why nature should
conspire to arrange for the marginal distributions to be the same for the two different
experimental arrangements.
Of course if the method to measure A with mutually commuting B,C, . . . consists of
successive filtrations—first measure A, then B, then C, etc.— and successive filtrations
are also used to measure A with mutually commuting L,M, . . ., then if A is the first
observable tested in either case, the resulting statistics for A alone will necessarily be
the same in both cases, since we need not even decide which case to proceed with until
after we have acquired the result of the A-measurement. But this merely shifts the puzzle
raised by the non-contextuality of quantum mechanical probabilities to a new form: why
should the statistical results of a sequential measurement of a set of mutually commuting
observables be independent of the way we order them? Even more puzzling, why are
those statistics unaffected if we change to quite a different way of determining them? We
could, for example, measure three mutually commuting observables A, B, and C, each with
eigenvalues 1 or 0 (like the squared spin components in the original Bell-KS argument) by
measuring the single observable 4A + 2B + C, the three digit binary form of the result
24 An “only available explanation” is one to which the only alternative is the claim that
no explanation is required.
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giving precisely the values of A, B, and C. If one is attempting a hidden-variables model at
all, it seems not unreasonable to expect the model to provide the obvious explanation for
this striking insensitivity of the distribution to changes in the experimental arrangement—
namely that the hidden variables are non-contextual.
There is, however, one class of no-hidden-variables theorems in which non-contextual-
ity can be replaced by an even more compelling assumption, which brings us, finally, to
Bell’s Theorem (Bell, 1964).
VIII. LOCALITY REPLACES non-contextuality:
BELL’S THEOREM
Suppose that the experiment that measures commuting observables A, B, C, . . . uses
independent pieces of equipment far apart from one another, which separately register the
values of A, B, C, . . . . And suppose that the experiment to measure A with the commuting
observable L, M , . . . , not all of which commute with all of B, C, . . . , requires changes in
the complete apparatus that amount only to replacing the parts that register the values
of B, C, . . . with different pieces of equipment that register the values of L, M , . . . . And
suppose that all these changes of equipment are made far away from the unchanged piece
of apparatus that registers the value of A. In the absence of action at a distance such
changes in the complete disposition of the apparatus could hardly be expected to have
an effect on the outcome of the A–measurement on an individual system. In this case
the problematic assumption of non-contextuality can be replaced by a straightforward
assumption of locality.
Can we prove a Bell-KS theorem in which we only assume non-contextuality when
it can be justified by locality? I know of no way to accomplish this trick that works for
arbitrary states, but if one is willing to settle for a proof that works only for suitably
prepared states, then it can easily be done. This was first accomplished in Bell’s Theorem,
which in its original form applies to a pair of far-apart spin-1
2
particles in the singlet
state. An analogous theorem can be established by a very minor modification of the 8-
dimensional version of the Bell-KS theorem.25 This new version of Bell’s Theorem makes
it clear that the use of a particular state is required to provide the information that is lost
when one permits the assignment of non-contextual values only when non-contextuality is
a consequence of locality.
25 The modification converts it into the model of Greenberger, Horne, and Zeilinger, in
the version I gave in Mermin, 1990b,c.
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To convert the 8-dimensional version of the Bell-KS theorem into a form of Bell’s
Theorem, we interpret the three vector operators σi, until now merely a convenient set
from which to construct more general observables, as literally describing the spins of three
different spin-1
2
particles, localized far away from one another. An examination of the ten
observables appearing in Fig. 4 reveals that all but the four appearing on the horizontal
line of the star describe spin components of a single isolated particle. Setting aside the
four non-local observables, each of which is built out of the product of spin components of
all three particles, we are left with six observables belonging to four sets, each containing
three local observables, lying on the four non-horizontal lines of the star. Each observable
associated with a single particle appears in two of these sets, which differ in the selection
of the pair of observables associated with the two far away particles. For any of these six
local observables, the assumption that the value assigned it should not depend on which
pair of far-away components are measured with it is justified not by a possibly dubious
assumption of non-contextuality, but by the condition of locality.
By dropping the non-contextual assignment of values to the four non-local observ-
ables, however, we break the chain of relations that led to a contradiction in the Bell-KS
argument. We can rescue the argument by noting that because all four non-local observ-
ables commute with each other, they have simultaneous eigenstates. In an ensemble of
individual systems prepared in such an eigenstate, the non-local observables all have defi-
nite values for valid and conventional quantum mechanical reasons. These values play the
same role in the new argument as the non-contextual values assigned them played in the
earlier version, being related to the values of the appropriate sets of three local observables
in exactly the same way.26 The only difference is that because we now consider systems
in an eigenstate of all four non-local observables, those four simultaneous values cannot
fluctuate among the eight possible sets they might in general possess, but are fixed to a set
of values. This further constraint does not alter the conclusion that there is no consistent
way to assign values to all ten observables and thus, in particular, no consistent assignment
of values to the six local observables.
The 8-dimensional model of three spins– 1
2
therefore provides a conceptual link be-
tween the two theorems of John Bell that was not evident in their original forms. The
difference between the two 8-dimensional arguments is that the Bell-KS version rules out
26 For example if σ1x, σ
2
x, and σ
3
x are measured in an eigenstate of σ
1
xσ
2
xσ
3
x with given
eigenvalue, orthodox quantum mechanics requires the product of the three results to be
equal to that eigenvalue.
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the assignment of non-contextual values to arbitrary observables, while the Bell’s Theo-
rem version rules it out even when non-contextuality is restricted to cases where it can be
justified on the basis of locality. While both theorems demonstrate that the assignment is
impossible, the demonstration based on locality is the more powerful result since it applies
even under a restricted use of non-contextuality.
Because the Bell-KS version applies to no-hidden-variables theories that are allowed
to assign non-contextual values to a more general class of observables than in the Bell’s
Theorem version, the Bell-KS version does not need the properties of a particular state.
In Bell’s original versions of these theorems, where the arguments could not be set side–
by–side, this appeared to be a compensating strength of the Bell-KS argument. In the
new version, however, it is seen to be merely a technical consequence of the fact that by
making a broader assignment of non-contextual hidden variables, the Bell-KS argument
can dispense with one of the stratagems the more powerful argument of Bell’s Theorem
requires to produce its counterexample.
It is instructive to see why we cannot convert the 4-dimensional version of the Bell-
KS theorem into an argument based on locality. In that argument (see Fig. 3) there
are four local and five non-local observables that we now interpret as describing two far-
apart spin-1
2
particles. Each local observable can be measured with either of two other
local observables that fail to commute with each other, associated with the other far-away
particle. If we wish to make the asumption of non-contextuality only when it is required
by the weaker assumption of locality, then we cannot assign non-contextual values to the
five non-local observables, and need some other way to complete the chain leading to a
contradiction. But in contrast to the 8-dimensional argument, the non-local observables
do not all commute. It is thus no longer possible to assign values to all five by considering
an ensemble of systems prepared in a simultaneous eigenstate. The theorem cannot be
converted into a version of Bell’s Theorem.
Note that locality can be used not only to justify the condition of non-contextuality,
but also to motivate further the attempt to assign values to the local observables in the
first place. For in an ensemble of systems described by a simultaneous eigenstate of the
non-local observables, the results of measuring any one of the local observables on an
individual system can be determined prior to the measurement, by first measuring far away
an appropriate set of two other local observables. Because the results of the measurements
of the three local observables must be consistent with the eigenvalue of the observable that
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is their product, any two such results determines the third. As noted long ago by Einstein,
Podolsky, and Rosen (Einstein, 1935), in the absence of spooky actions at a distance it is
hard to understand how this can happen unless the two earlier measurements are simply
revealing properties of the subsequently measured particle that already exist prior to their
measurement.
IX. A LITTLE ABOUT BOHM THEORY
Bell’s favorite example of a hidden-variables theory, Bohm theory,∗ is not only ex-
plicitly contextual but explicitly and spectacularly non-local,27 as it must be in view of
the Bell-KS theorem and Bell’s Theorem. In Bohm theory, which defies all the impossi-
bility proofs, the hidden variables are simply the real configuration space coordinates of
real particles, guided in their motion by the wave function, which is viewed as a real field
in configuration space. The wave function guides the particles like this:28 each particle
obeys a first order equation of motion specifying that its velocity is proportional to the
gradient with respect to its position coordinates of the phase of the N -particle wave func-
tion, evaluated at the instantaneous positions of all the other particles. It is the italicized
phrase which is responsible for the “hideous” non-locality whenever the wave function is
correlated.29 One easily proves that if the wave function obeys Schroedinger’s equation,
then a distribution of initial coordinates of the particles given by |Ψ0|2, will evolve under
these dynamics into |Ψt|2 at time t.30
If two particles are in a correlated state then because the field guiding the second
particle depends on the trajectory of the first, if a field is suddenly turned on in a region
where the first particle happens to be, the subsequent motion of the second particle can
∗ Bohm, 1952.
27 This is noted in Bell, 1966, where Bell raises the question of whether “any hidden-
variables account of quantum mechanics must have this extraordinary character. (Remem-
ber, this was written before Bell, 1964!) Bell, 1982, reprinted as Chapter 17 of Bell, 1987,
gives a more detailed discussion of Bohm theory from this perspective. Chapters 14 and
15 of Bell, 1987 give an exceptionally clear and concise exposition of Bohm theory.
28 I describe only spinless particles, but spin can also be handled.
29 If the wave function factors then the phase is a sum of phases associated with the
individual particles and the non-locality goes away.
30 This is the way Bell presents Bohm theory. Bohm prefers to take another time deriva-
tive of the equation of motion for the particles to make it look more like F = ma, which
he gets, with corrections to the classical force arising from what he calls the “quantum
potential.”
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be drastically altered in a manner that does not diminish with the distance between the
two particles. Since measurements on each of a collection of non-interacting particles can
be described by the action of just such fields, this gives contextuality with a vengeance.
X. THE LAST WORD
John Bell did not believe that either of his no-hidden-variables theorems excluded the
possibility of a deeper level of description than quantum mechanics, any more than von
Neumann’s theorem does. He viewed them all as identifying conditions that such a descrip-
tion would have to meet. Von Neumann’s theorem established only that a hidden-variables
theory must assign values to non-commuting observables that do not obey in individual
systems the additivity condition they satisfy in the mean—a result already evident from
the trivial example of σx + σy. The Bell-KS theorems establish that in a hidden-variables
theory the values assigned even to a set of mutually commuting observables must depend
on the manner in which they are measured—a fact that Bohr could have told us long
ago (although he would have disapproved of the whole undertaking). And Bell’s Theorem
establishes that the value assigned to an observable must depend on the complete exper-
imental arrangement under which it is measured even when two arrangements differ only
far from the region in which the value is ascertained—a fact that Bohm theory exemplifies,
and which is now understood to be an unavoidable feature of any hidden variables-theory.
To those for whom non-locality is anathema, Bell’s Theorem finally spells the death
of the hidden-variables program.31 But not for Bell. None of the no-hidden-variables
theorems persuaded him that hidden variables were impossible. What Bell’s Theorem
did suggest to Bell was the need to reexamine our understanding of Lorentz invariance,
as he argues in his delightful essay on how to teach special relativity∗ and in Dennis
Weaire’s transcription of Bell’s lecture on the Fitzgerald contraction.∗∗ “What is proved
by impossibility proofs,” Bell declared, “is lack of imagination.”32
31 Many people contend that Bell’s Theorem demonstrates non-locality independent of
a hidden-variables program, but there is not general agreement about this.
∗ Bell, 1987, p. 12.
∗∗ Bell, 1992.
32 Bell, 1982. Although I gladly give John Bell the last word, I will take the last footnote
to insist that he is unreasonably dismissive of the importance of his own impossibility
proofs. One could make a complementary criticism of much of contemporary theoretical
physics: What is proved by possibility proofs is an excess of imagination. Either criticism
undervalues the importance of defining limits to what speculative theories can or cannot
be expected to accomplish.
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